RE: [wsbpel] policy annotations and BPEL

From
Edwin Khodabakchian <>
Date
2003-10-20T18:05:16+00:00
ID
Thread
RE: [wsbpel] policy annotations and BPEL
Ron,

 

All this seems rather abstract to me so I will tend to 
agree with Satish that we should not over engineer areas of the language where 
the requirements are not cristal clear. Could you please provide a detailed us 
case with associated WSDL, BPEL and Deployment Descriptor?

 

Thank you,

 

Edwin

  

  
  From: Ron Ten-Hove 
  [mailto:] 
Sent: Monday, October 20, 2003 
  10:39 AM
To: Satish Thatte
Cc: 
  
Subject: Re: [wsbpel] policy annotations 
  and BPEL

  

Satish,

Satish Thatte enscribed upon magnetic domains:

  
    
    

    

    

    

    
WS-Policy and 
    general assertion mechanisms like it don’t force you to express requirements 
    at any specific level of detail (such as XML canonicalization) — so the 
    issue of detail vs high level intent seems like a red herring to me relative 
    to that sort of general mechanism.

The 
  WS-Policy framework certainly doesn't force this level of specificity, but 
  WS-SecurityPolicy certainly works at this level. It was to WS-SecurityPolicy 
  that I was referring. Is there an alternative Policy vocabulary for "Security 
  Intents" that you are offering for discussion?[1]

  
    

    

    

    
I see two specific 
    issues which I still don’t see addressed

    

    
      
BPEL processes 
      are not self-sufficient.  They have dependencies on WSDL and other 
      related artifacts.  Whatever the level of intent at which one wants 
      to express QoS requirements, they need to be expressed uniformly for the 
      package of related artifacts 

This 
  assertion (the need for uniform expression) seems to contradict your prior 
  assertion, that business intent can be modelled using the WS-Policy framework. 
  I am confused: what are you advocating?

Regardless, it is true that we 
  are creating a constellation of inter-related artifacts that are needed to 
  describe a working system. The real issue we are debating is: where is the 
  most appropriate location in this constellation for QoS intentions, as well as 
  QoS details. Lumping them together in a single, uniform declaration seems an 
  unnatural act. The lower-level details expressable in WS-SecurityPolicy are an 
  implementation of the higher-level intents. There is a strong coupling between 
  the business process and the QoS intentions that are a logical part of that 
  process. There is a strong coupling between the QoS details and the service 
  descriptions. Thus my assertion that lumping them together is an unnatural 
  act: it is poor architecture.

Perhaps some of our disagreement stems 
  from some unstated assumptions. Your arguments certainly make more sense if we 
  look only at run-time considerations, and ignore the design-time. Is this 
  case?

  
    

    
      

      
 Your 
      approach requires us to invent a private BPEL notation for high level QoS 
      requirements which I think is a rathole in itself, and one where others 
      will undoubtedly assert prior initiative if not ownership 
      

I have already proposed such a notation; it is 
  not complex, nor, in itself controversial. The real rathole is debating the 
  applicability of this approach to a set of proprietrary specifications that 
  have different architectural ideas. This is not in the scope of the TC, nor is 
  it in the best interests of the standards-setting process.

I'm not sure 
  to whom you refer, when you state that "other will undoubtedly assert prior 
  initiative..." Is there a need to set up a liason with some other standards TC 
  / WG?

  
    

    
      

    

    
I won’t get into 
    the fuzziness argument but I don’t equate abstraction with fuzziness 
    ;-)

Then we "agree to disagree" on this 
  point; I wasn't looking forward to "dictionaries at twenty paces." :-)

  
    

    

    

-Ron