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RE: [security-services] New authentication method for One-Time Password?
Actually, Phill, I feel that although the
physical hardware token may only be one of the factors, the relevant
information about the authentication method is that it was a 2-factor
authentication. Now there may be more specificity desired when evaluating the
method, but that's probably true for the other currently defined
methods. With a password authentication, I may very well want to know characteristics
of the password (length, entropy, etc.). For X.509 certs, I may want to
know the specific authn method a specific authentication was performed using
the key (e.g.SPKI) - and of course we already provided some of
those. For 2factor, I may want to know that it was a 2factor hardware
token authentication, etc. But I at least need to know that it was a
2factor authentication.
I don't think we want to get into
too many refinements of authentication methods at this point. Liberty
Alliance is also doing this as part of their authentication profiles. MS
is doing some of this in WS-License. But I do need to be able to
distinguish the 2-factor "class" of authentication from a password
class or an X.509 class.
Make sense? If so, I'd prefer
to see something like 2FACTOR.
Thanks.
Rob
Philpott
RSA Security Inc.
The Most Trusted Name in
e-Security
Tel: 781-515-7115
Mobile: 617-510-0893
Fax: 781-515-7020
mailto:
-----Original Message-----
From: Hallam-Baker, Phillip
[mailto:]
Sent: Friday, April 05, 2002 1:57
PM
To: Hallam-Baker, Phillip;
Philpott, Robert; oasis sstc ()
Subject: RE: [security-services]
New authentication method for One-Time Pa ssword?
When I spoke to Jeff I agreed to post the
relevant document node to the list when I have drafted it. The main problem is
working out the name for the #%#$^ thing.
I am currently favoring
PersonalHardwareToken which may be used to apply to any of the time based
tokens or challenge response tokens in use. The term Token appears to me to be
far to ambiguous (I find the GSSAPI specification impossible to tread because
it witters on about tokens at inordinate length), the essential issue here
appears to be that the token is something carried, i.e. we are talking about a
human authentication mechanism here.
Phill
-----Original Message-----
From: Hallam-Baker, Phillip
[mailto:]
Sent: Friday, April 05, 2002 12:25
AM
To: Philpott, Robert; oasis sstc
()
Subject: RE: [security-services]
New authentication method for One-Time Pa ssword?
OK how about
SomethingCarried
and we can also add in for completeness
SomethingYouAre :-)
I dislike 2 factor since it might only be
one of the factors.
-----Original Message-----
From: Philpott, Robert
[mailto:]
Sent: Thursday, April 04, 2002
10:37 PM
To: oasis sstc
()
Subject: RE: [security-services]
New authentication method for One-Time Pa ssword?
> I think that the Password auth method
may be considered to cover this at the least.
Hi Phill - Unfortunately, we really need
something distinct from password since we have some applications that MUST know
whether a user authenticated with a single factor (e.g. LDAP password) or a
2-factor (e.g. SecurID token) authn method.
As I said, if folks object to a
proprietary method (SECURID), I can live with something that at least indicates
it was a 2-factor authentication. Recommendations?
"TOKEN" - too
generic? does not necessarily indicate 2-factor strength?
"2FACTOR" - perhaps
this is the better choice
"OTP" - I don't think
we should use this one since there's an RFC by this name that's specific
to onlky one of several OTP methods
-----Original Message-----
From: Hallam-Baker, Phillip
[mailto:]
Sent: Thursday, April 04, 2002
9:27 PM
To: Philpott, Robert; oasis sstc
()
Subject: RE: [security-services]
New authentication method for One-Time Pa ssword?
I think that the Password
auth method may be considered to cover this at the least.
If more specificity is required
I would suggest that the method merely specify a hardware token rather than any
particular proprietary means of achieving that (unless we want to spend more
time with lawyers).
If an application cares
about the vendor of the token let the vendor specify the uri out of their oid
arc :-)
-----Original
Message-----
From: Philpott, Robert
[mailto:]
Sent: Thursday, April 04, 2002
6:31 PM
To: oasis sstc
()
Subject: [security-services] New
authentication method for One-Time Password?
I hesitate bringing this up so late,
but a) we did just add an authn method for SRP, and b) our SAML implementation
really needs an authn method defined for RSA SecurID time-based token
authentication. Would you please consider adding the following authn
method to the core spec?
7.1.?? RSA SecurID
URI: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:SECURID
The
authentication was performed using an RSA Security time-based SecurID token.
I
considered referring to IETF "rfc2808 - The SecurID® SASL
Mechanism", which does describe the method, but in the context of
SASL. I decided a specific SAML domain qualifier made more sense.
If you would prefer, we could live
with a generalization of the method type as "Time-Based Token" (TBT?
TOKEN?)
Since
SecurID is also a form of One-Time Password, of which there are many other
types, I also considered following the model we used for X509, where we would
have:
7.1.?? One-Time Password
URI: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:OTP
The
authentication was performed by some (unspecified) mechanism using a One-Time
Password. It may have been one of the mechanisms for which a more specific
identifier has been defined below.
7.1.?? RSA SecurID
URI: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:SECURID
The
authentication was performed using an RSA Security time-based SecurID token.
Etc.
But
then I discovered that IETF rfc2289 defines a specific OTP method based on
S/Key. So, it didn't make sense to me to have the SAML-defined OTP which
might get confused with the rfc2289 method.
If we don't add this to the core
spec, our implementation will have to define one for our own use. But
SecurID is a VERY widely used time-based token (2-factor) authentication method,
so I'd prefer having the SECURID method defined. As I said, I'd also
settle for the TBT/TOKEN method.
Comments?
Rob Philpott
RSA Security Inc.
The Most Trusted Name in e-Security
Tel:
781-515-7115
Mobile:
617-510-0893
Fax:
781-515-7020
mailto:
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