Re: [cti] Threat Actor Sophistication Levels

I would rather make tweaks to what we have extensively worked on instead of opening a new month long debate about doing something different.  After working on this for a month and half I think we are close.  

Bret 

Sent from my Commodore 64

On Aug 8, 2016, at 7:02 AM, Wunder, John A. <> wrote:

I also like using something that already exists.

 

Our current sophistication levels come from STIX 1.x, which originally came from iSight several years ago. The Intel work also has levels. The DSB paper that Mark linked has the levels
 that Pat pasted below. I would prefer we use one of these rather than come up with a superset…the danger in combining several taxonomies is that you risk muddying the waters when they overlap.

 

As to which one…if both Pat and Mark like the DSB one (it’s on page 22 here:

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ResilientMilitarySystems.CyberThreat.pdf) and we’re free to use it (it’s public and USG work so I believe the answer is yes) I’m happy with that. The breakdown between using/creating tools and using/finding/creating vulnerabilities
 makes a lot of sense to me.

 

John

 

From: 
<> on behalf of Patrick Maroney <>

Date: Sunday, August 7, 2016 at 1:56 PM

To: Bret Jordan <>, "" <>

Subject: Re: [cti] Threat Actor Sophistication Levels

 

Disregard my comments- [+1] to Mark's suggestion.  Anytime we can adopt an existing well vetted taxonomy, we should.

 

Tier Description 

 

I Practitioners who rely on others to develop the malicious code, delivery mechanisms, and execution strategy (use known exploits).

 

II Practitioners with a greater depth of experience, with the ability to develop their own tools (from publically known vulnerabilities).

 

III Practitioners who focus on the discovery and use of unknown malicious code, are adept at installing user and kernel mode root kits10, frequently use data mining tools, target corporate executives and key users (government and industry)
 for the purpose of stealing personal and corporate data with the expressed purpose of selling the information to other criminal elements.

 

IV Criminal or state actors who are organized, highly technical, proficient, well funded professionals working in teams to discover new vulnerabilities and develop exploits.

 

V State actors who create vulnerabilities through an active program to “influence” commercial products and services during design, development or manufacturing, or with the ability to impact products while in
 the supply chain to enable exploitation of networks and systems of interest.             

Patrick Maroney

President

Integrated Networking Technologies, Inc.

Desk: (856)983-0001

Cell: (609)841-5104

Email: 

 

On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 1:45 PM -0400, "Patrick Maroney" <> wrote:

Comments inline:

Patrick Maroney

Email: 

Cell: (609)841-5104

 

_____________________________

From: Jordan, Bret <>

Sent: Saturday, August 6, 2016 9:28 PM

Subject: [cti] Threat Actor Sophistication Levels

To: <>

These may be too granular for what are ultimately subjective assertions an analyst will make. Can we establish non-subjective criteria for each category?

 

Unspecified

Novice (script kiddie)

operator 

Focuses on specific tasks within a campaign

Can operate systems for an attack

Can run tool kits designed by others

Is a contributor to a larger organization <<<remove-not a discriminator >>>

technician 

Focuses on specific mission objectives and goals

Can troubleshoot and fix systems used in an attack

Can execute attack plans and campaigns

professional 

Focuses on broad tactical and mission goals

Can identify targets and build attack plans

Can use and <<<tailor>> advanced toolkits

architect 

Focuses on broad organizational goals

Can design the attack infrastructure 

specialist 

Has very specialized skills but is not planning on running the show

Reverse Engineers

1-day Malware Author. <<<what is 1-day?>>>

Botnet infrastructure architect

expert 

Focuses on strategic goals

Able to plan very elaborate and advanced attacks

Is a specialist in more than one area

0-day Malware Author

innovator 

Thinks and plans for the future

Designs new malware toolkits

Innovates and move the attacker community forward

Is an expert in more than one area

 

 

Thanks,

 

Bret

 

 

 

Bret Jordan CISSP

Director of Security Architecture and Standards | Office of the CTO

Blue Coat Systems

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"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."