Hi!,
Yep, I totally support this idea. Anything where we can start to get some consistency is a good thing. Too many threat repositories and other systems have
a million ways of describing the same thing. Anything which we can all use as a group is great, especially when it comes to linking and tracking all of the bad behaviour that is out there.
Everyone has a different way to write a TTP, Campaign or Threat Actor, bring some similarity into the picture is a good thing.
Regards,
Dean
From: [mailto:]
On Behalf Of Terry MacDonald
Sent: Friday, 15 January 2016 10:39 AM
To: Mark Clancy;
Subject: [cti] RE: Face to Face - RM4 - Prop 9 relationships
This is
exactly the idea behind the ID format that we proposed in the TWIGS specification. Organizations would be able to produce easy to remember objects that would be used as ‘library objects’ that others would be able to use and reference. In this way, we
could create a list of common Attack-Pattern objects based on CAPEC, and they would just be available for use by anyone.
We could then over time build up a picture of which threat actors use which attack patterns in a way that allows us
to easily traverse the graph relationships between them thanks to the ‘shared’ library objects that link them.
Cheers
Terry MacDonald
Senior STIX Subject Matter Expert
SOLTRA | An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company
+61 (407) 203 206 |
From:
[mailto:]
On Behalf Of Mark Clancy
Sent: Friday, 15 January 2016 7:45 AM
To:
Subject: [cti] Face to Face - RM4 - Prop 9 relationships
So one thought I want to inject which is hard to do on the phone. We should also talk about the use of Reference Data as binding glue when dealing with relationships.
For example why does everyone on the planet need to create their own STIX object in their own namespace for a "spear phishing" TTP. So that Org1 and Org2 "Spear phishing" TTPs are different things as they are unique STIX objects when in fact they really should
have been the same. Yes there are variants of Spear Phishing which may also be generic TTP like say Whaling and others that are specific to a Threat Actor which will related to Spear Phishing are really more unique.
-Mark
Mark Clancy
Chief Executive Officer
SOLTRA
|
An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company
+1.813.470.2400
office
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+1.610.659.6671 US mobile
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One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense.
From:
<> on behalf of Alexander Foley <>
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2016 3:03 PM
To:
Subject: [cti] Groups - OASIS CTI TC F2F - STIX 1b.pdf uploaded
Document Name:
OASIS CTI TC F2F - STIX 1b.pdf
Description
Strawman #2 (Sean Barnum + Group)
Download Latest Revision
Public Download Link
Submitter: Alexander Foley
Group: OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) TC
Folder: Calendar Documents
Date submitted: 2016-01-14 12:03:07
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